Zika has emerged as a global public health concern. Although its rapid geographic expansion can be attributed to the success of its Aedes mosquito vectors, local epidemiological drivers are still poorly understood. The city of Feira de Santana played a pivotal role in the early phases of the Chikungunya and Zika epidemics in Brazil. Here, using a climate-driven transmission model, we show that low Zika observation rates and a high vectorial capacity in this region were responsible for a high attack rate during the 2015 outbreak and the subsequent decline in cases in 2016, when the epidemic was peaking in the rest of the country. Our projections indicate that the balance between the loss of herd-immunity and the frequency of viral re-importation will dictate the transmission potential of Zika in this region in the near future. Sporadic outbreaks are expected but unlikely to be detected under current surveillance systems. 2 Camaçari city in the state of Bahia [1] and in Natal, the state capital city of Rio Grande do 3 Norte [2]. During that year, the epidemic in Camaçari quickly spread to other municipalities 4 of the Bahia state, including the capital city of Salvador, which together accounted for 5 over 90% of all notified Zika cases in Brazil in 2015 [3]. During this period, many local 6
The first cases of Zika virus (ZIKV) in Brazil were concurrently reported in March 2015 in On the 1 st February 2015 the first ZIKV cases were reported in FSA, followed by a 13 large epidemic that continued into 2016. The rise in ZIKV incidence in FSA coincided 14 temporally with an increase in cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) and microcephaly [3] , 15 with an unprecedented total of 21 confirmed cases of microcephaly in FSA between January 16 2015 and December 2016. Although the causal link between ZIKV and severe manifestations 17 is still under debate [6, 7, 8] , the possible association has led to the declaration of the 18 South American epidemic as an international public health emergency by the World Health 19 Organization (WHO); the response to which has been limited to vector control initiatives 20 and advice to delay pregnancy in the affected countries [9, 10] . With few cohort studies 21 published and the lack of an established experimental model for ZIKV infection [11, 12] , 22 modelling efforts have taken a central role for advancing our understanding of the virus's 23 epidemiology [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] . In particular, quantifications of public health 24 relevant parameters, such as the basic reproduction number (R 0 ), the duration of infection 25 [14] , attack and reporting rates [20] , the risk of sexual transmission [21] and birth-associated 26 microcephaly [22, 18] are predominantly due to studies using transmission models. Crucially, 27 however, and despite their major importance on the epidemiological dynamics of other 28 arboviral diseases, such as dengue [23, 24, 25, 26] and chikungunya [27, 28, 29] , the effects 29 of local climate variables, such as temperature and rainfall, have not yet been explored in 30 relation to Zika transmission. 31 In this study, focusing on an urban centre of Brazil (Feira de Santana), we explicitly 32 model the mosquito-vector lifecycle under seasonal, weather-driven variations. Using notified 33 case data of both the number of suspected Zika infections and gestations with neurological 34 complications, we demonstrate how the combination of high suitability for viral transmission 35 and low detection rates resulted in an extremely high attack rate during the first epidemic 36 wave in 2015. The rapid accumulation of herd-immunity significantly reduced the number 37 of cases during the following year, when the disease was peaking elsewhere in the country. 38 Projecting forward we find that the demographic loss of herd-immunity together with the 39 frequency of reintroduction will dictate the risk of re-mergence and endemic establishment 40 of Zika in this and similar geographic settings in the near future.
greater geographical setting composed of 80 municipalities summing up to a population of 47 2.5 million. Although major improvements in water supply have been accomplished in recent 48 decades, with about 90% of the population having direct access to piped water, supply is 49 unstable and is common practice to resort to household storage. Together with an ideal 50 (tropical) local climate, these are favourable breeding conditions for species of the Aedes 51 genus of mosquitoes, which are the main transmission vector of ZIKV, CHIKV and DENV 52 that are all co-circulating in the region [25, 30] . FSA's population is generally young, with 53 approximately 30% of individuals under the age of 20 and 60% under the age of 34. In the 54 year of 2015, the female:male sex ratio in FSA was 0.53 and the number of births 10352, 55 leading to a birth rate standard measure of 31 new-borns per 1000 females in the population. 56 Climate data 57 Local climatic data (rainfall, humidity, temperature) for the period between January 2013 58 and 2016 was collected from the Brazilian open repository for education and research 59 (BDMEP, Banco de Dados Meteorológicos para Ensino e Pesquisa) [31] . The climate in Feira 60 de Santana is defined as semi-arid (warm but dry), with sporadic periods of rain concetrated 61 within the months of April and July. Between 2013 and 2015, mean yearly temperature was 62 24.6 celsius (range 22.5-26.6), total precipitation was 856 mm (range 571-1141), and mean 63 humidity levels 79.5% (range 70.1-88.9%).
64
Zika virus notified case data 65 ZIKV surveillance in Brazil is conducted through the national notifiable diseases information 66 system (Sistema de Informação de Agravos de Notificação, SINAN), which relies on passive 67 case detection. Suspected cases are notified given the presence of pruritic maculopapular 68 rash (flat, red area on the skin that is covered with small bumps) together with two or 69 more symptoms among: low fever, or polyarthralgia (joint pain), or periarticular edema 70 (joint swelling), or conjunctival hyperemia (eye blood vessel dilation) without secretion and 71 pruritus (itching) [32, 33] . The main differences to case definition of DENV and CHIKV are 72 the particular type of pruritic maculopapular rash and low fever (as applied during the Yap 73 Island ZIKV epidemic [34] ). The data presented in Figure 1 (for both Brazil and Feira de 74 Santana) represents notified suspected cases and was collected from the SINAN repository. 75 Here, we use the terms epidemic wave and outbreak interchangeably (but see [18] ).
76
Microcephaly and severe neurological complications case data 77 A total of 51 suspected cases with microcephaly or other neurological complications were 78 reported in FSA between January 2015 and December 2016. The first confirmed microcephaly 79 case was reported on the 25th of October 2015 and virtually all consequent cases were 80 notified before the summer of 2016. From these, after birth and follow up, 15 cases were 81 cleared as not presenting abnormal development. Using guidelines for microcephaly diagnosis 82 provided in March 2016 by the WHO (as in [35] ), a total of 21 cases were confirmed by the 83 end of 2016. Neurological complications not fitting microcephaly case definition were also 84 found in 3 infants. A total of 3 foetal deaths were reported for mothers with confirmed 85 ZIKV infection during gestation but for which no microcephaly assessment was available.
86
Transmission model and fitting 87 To model the transmission dynamics of ZIKV infections and estimate relevant epidemiological 88 parameters, we fitted an ento-epidemiological, climate-driven transmission model to ZIKV 89 incidence and climate data of Feira de Santana between 2015 and 2016 within a Bayesian 90 framework, similar to our previous work on a dengue outbreak in the Island of Madeira [23] . 91 The general model structure is outlined below; full model details can be found as supporting 92 material.
93
The model is based on ordinary differential equations (ODE) describing the dynamics 94 of viral infections within the human and mosquito populations (eqn. S1-S5 and S6-S10, 95 respectively). The human population is assumed to be fully susceptible before the intro-96 duction of ZIKV and is kept constant in size throughout the period of observation. After 97 an infectious mosquito bite, individuals first enter an incubation phase, after which they 98 become infectious to a mosquito for a limited period of time. Fully recovered individuals 99 are assumed to retain life-long immunity. We assumed that sexual transmission did not 100 significantly contribute to transmission dynamics and therefore ignored its effects [36] .
101
For the dynamics of the vector populations we divided mosquitoes into two life-stages: 102 aquatic and adult females. Adult mosquitoes were further divided into the epidemiologically 103 relevant stages for arboviral transmission: susceptible, incubating and infectious. In contrast 104 to human hosts, mosquitoes remain infectious for life. The ODE model comprised 8 climate-105 dependent entomological parameters (aquatic to adult transition rate, aquatic mortality 106 rate, adult mortality rate, oviposition rate, incubation period, transmission probability to 107 human, hatching success rate and biting rate), whose dependencies on temperature, rainfall 108 and humidity were derived from other studies (see Table S1 ).
109
Four parameters (baseline mosquito biting rate, mosquito sex ratio, probability of 110 transmission from human-to-vector and human lifespan) were fixed to their expected mean 111 values, taken from the literature (see Table S2 ). To estimate the remaining parameters, 112 alongside parameter distributions regarding the date of first infection, the human infectious 113 and incubating periods, and the observation rate of notified ZIKV cases, we fitted the ODE 114 model to weekly notified cases of ZIKV in FSA using a Bayesian Markov-chain Monte Carlo 115 (MCMC) approach. The results are presented both in terms of mean dynamic behaviour 116 of the ODE under the MCMC solutions and posterior distributions of key epidemiological 117 parameters. A full description of the fitting approach and the estimated parameters can be 118 found as supporting material.
119

Results
120
On the 1 st February 2015 the first Zika virus (ZIKV) case was reported in Feira de Santana 121 (FSA). Weekly cases remained very low for the following two months, adding up to just 10 122 notified cases by the end of March that year ( Figure 1A) . A rapid increase in the number 123 of cases was observed in April, coinciding with Micareta, a local carnival-like festival that 124 takes place across the urban centres of Bahia. The epidemic peaked in July 2015, which was 125 followed by a sharp decline in notified cases over the next 1-2 months. This first epidemic 126 wave was followed by a significantly smaller outbreak in 2016, peaking around March with 127 only a handful of notified cases. 128 Overall, the epidemic behaviour in FSA was in sharp contrast with trends observed in 129 notified cases across Brazil (BR), for which the second epidemic in 2016 was approximately 6 130 times larger than the one in 2015 ( Figure 1A ). Nonetheless, a clear temporal synchronization 131 between country level and FSA case counts was observed, with the timing of first notifications 132 in both datasets reiterating the Bahia state as a focus point in the emergence of ZIKV 133 notified case data in Brazil [35, 3] . The age distribution of ZIKV notified cases in FSA suggested a higher proportion 147 of cases between 20 and 50 years of age, but with no discernible differences between the 148 two epidemics ( Figure 1B , top panel). However, when corrected for the expected number 149 of cases assuming an equal risk of infection per age class, we found the number of cases 150 within this age group to be closer to most other groups (incidence rate ratio, IRR, close to 151 1, Figure 1B , bottom panel). The per capita case counts within the youngest age class (<1 152 years) appeared significantly more than expected, with an IRR significantly above 1 and 153 also higher in 2016 (IRR=4.4, 95% CI [2.8, 7.0]) when compared to 2015 (IRR=1.95, 95% 154 CI [1.5, 2.6]). There was also a consistent trend towards reduced IRR in the elderly (>65 155 years), although with significant uncertainty. Finally, a small increase in IRR was observed 156 for the 20-34 year olds, which could potentially be a signature of sexual transmission in this 157 age group [21, 30, 37, 38, 36] . With the lack of more detailed data it was not possible to 158 ascertain whether these findings indicated notification bias, age-related risk of disease or 159 simply age-dependent exposure risk, however.
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The spatial distribution of total notified cases for BR highlighted the expected clustering 161 of ZIKV cases within the Bahia state by the end of 2015 as well as the wider geographical range 162 by July 2016 ( Figure 1C ). We speculated that the considerable difference in geographical 163 range could explain the higher number of cases observed during the 2016 epidemic at the 164 country level when compared to 2015. This, however, did not offer an explanation for 165 why the second epidemic in FSA was nearly 7 times smaller than the first. To answer 166 this question and to obtain robust parameter estimates of ZIKV epidemiological relevance 167 we utilised a dynamic transmission model, which we fitted to notified case data and local 168 climate variables of FSA within a Bayesian framework (see Materials and Methods).
169
Climate-driven vectorial capacity 170
The reliance on Aedes mosquitoes for transmission implies a strong dependency of ZIKV 171 transmission potential on temporal trends in the local climate. We therefore investigated 172 daily rainfall, humidity and mean temperature data in FSA between 2013 and 2016 ( Figure 173 2A). The data showed erratic fluctuations in rainfall with no clear seasonal trend and 174 sporadic episodes of intense rain. Temperature, on the other hand, presented a much clearer 175 seasonal signature with fixed amplitudes between 22 and 27 degree Celsius, peaking between 176 December and May. Humidity showed an intermediate scenario and appeared correlated 177 with periods of intense rainfall but negatively correlated with temperature.
178
By fitting our weather-driven transmission model to these local climate and ZIKV 179 case data we estimated the adult mosquito lifespan as well as the viral extrinsic incubation 180 period (EIP) for the same period (see Materials and Methods). As shown in Figure 2B , both 181 lifespan and incubation period showed seasonal oscillations with median values of around 182 14.7 and 5.7 days, respectively, which are well within the biological ranges found in the 183 literature ( [39, 40, 41, 42] and Table 1 ). Importantly, there was a strong negative temporal 184 correlation between these two variables, with periods of longer EIP coinciding with shorter 185 lifespans and vice-versa ( Figure 2B ).
186
From these climate-driven parameters we next calculated Zika's daily basic reproductive 187 number, R 0 (t). As expected, the negative relationship between EIP and vector lifespan 188 resulted in large temporal variations in vectorial capacity and thus seasonal oscillations in 189 R 0 , with a median value of 2.5 (range [0.95, 4.35]), peaking in the local summer months 190 between December and April. Following the qualitative climatic trends we found R 0 to 191 be highly correlated with mean temperature (R 2 = 0.91) and humidity (R 2 = 0.56) but 192 not correlated with rainfall (R 2 <0.01). In agreement with other reports (Table 1) , our 193 estimated mean R 0 for the two years preceding the ZIKV epidemic (2013-2014) was around 194 2.5. Notably, the transmission potential remained above 1 for the entire period, indicating a 195 high suitability of viral transmission of ZIKV in FSA and hence other areas with similar 196 climatic conditions. As shown in Figure 2C , our model closely reproduced both the dynamics and the sizes of the 211 two epidemic waves in FSA ( Figure 2C ) between 2015 and 2016. We furthermore obtained 212 a very close fit to the cumulative case data, which had reached a plateau by the end of the 213 2016 transmission season.
214
Four parameters of public health importance were estimated by our MCMC framework 215 (Table S3 ): the date of introduction, the human infectious period, the human (intrinsic) 216 incubation period, and the case observation rate. The posterior showed a strong support for 217 an introduction in mid to late January, with an estimated median date of 14th of January 218 2015, i.e. three weeks before the first notified case ( Figure 3A ). Our estimated medians 219 of the human incubation and infectious periods ( Figures 3C, D) were 4.8 days (95% CI 220 [2.6-9.8]).]) and 3.6 days (95% CI [2.2-5.0]) respectively, which were both within previously 221 estimated ranges of ZIKV (Table 1) .
222
Of particular interest here was the very low observation rate ( Figure 3B) , with a mean 223 of just 0.36% (95% CI [0.35-0.39]), which equates to less than 4 in 1000 infections having 224 been notified during the epidemic in FSA. Although lower than other previous reported 225 estimates, this would explain the relatively long period of apparently low viral circulation 226 before the epidemic took off in April, 2015. That is, based on our estimates, there were 227 just over 2,700 infections during the first 2 months, of which only 10 were notified. More 228 importantly, when applying this rate to the total number of cases we found that by the end 229 of the first epidemic wave around 69% (95% CI [66.3, 72.1]) of the population in FSA had 230 been infected by the virus. This high attack rate is not unusual for Zika, however, and is 231 in general agreement with observations elsewhere (Table 1) . Furthermore, it also offered 232 an explanation why the second wave in 2016 was so much smaller due to the substantial 233 accumulation of herd-immunity during the first wave. As illustrated by the cumulative attack rate in Figure 4A , and similarly to estimates from 244 other regions of the world (Table 1) , nearly 70% of the population got infected by ZIKV 245 infection by the end of 2015, which rose to over 80% (95% CI [77.7-85.9]) by the end of 2016. 246 Notably, during the first wave most cases occurred off-season, here defined by our estimated 247 daily reproductive number, R 0 (t), while the second wave appeared much more synchronized 248 with the period of high transmission potential. Notably, this temporal phenomenon has also 249 been observed for the chikungunya virus (CHKV) when it was first introduced into FSA in 250 2014 [5] .
251
The amassed accumulation of herd-immunity during the first wave resulted in a marked 252 difference between the estimated R 0 and the effective reproductive ratio (R e ) by the end of 253 2015 ( Figure 4A ), which in turn explained the huge reduction in Zika cases in FSA in 2016 254 when the virus was infecting a large number of individuals elsewhere ( Figures 1A, C) . By 255 the beginning of 2016, R e was estimated to be more than 3 times smaller than R 0 , which 256 increased to 5 by the beginning of 2017. Projecting into the future using average climate 257 data for this region and assuming normal demographic turnover in the population clearly 258 showed that the effective reproductive number is expected to remain <1 for the next few 259 years, suggesting a very weak potential for ZIKV endemicity in the near future. 
272
Without external introduction of infectious individuals (human or vector) our results 273 suggested a high likelihood of an epidemic fade-out by 2017 ( Figure 4A, B) . We therefore 274 projected ZIKV's epidemic potential over the next two decades (until 2040) assuming 275 different rates of viral introduction from other regions of Brazil or elsewhere ( Figures 4B, 276  C) . In general, our results clearly showed that the potential for ZIKV to cause another 277 outbreak or to establish itself endemically in FSA is strongly dependent on the frequency 278 of re-introductions. In particular, the expected low transmission potential due to current 279 herd-immunity levels together with infrequent introductions (≤ 1 a year) could result in long 280 periods of no circulation followed by sporadic and unpredictable epidemics in the range of 281 hundreds of infections ( Figures 4B, C green line) . In contrast, high rates of re-introductions 282 could allow for semi-endemic behaviour but with periods of up to a decade presenting low 283 incidence, during which susceptibility levels in the population would accumulate before 284 ZIKV could cause larger epidemics. Notably, however, the levels of re-introduction required 285 for endemic circulation may be unrealistically high (ex. [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] , and we would argue instead 286 that transmission of ZIKV in FSA will most likely be of sporadic and unpredictable nature 287 in the years to come.
288
Sensitivity to reporting and microcephaly risk 289 In effect, our observation rate entails the proportion of real cases that would have been 290 notified if symptomatic and correctly diagnosed as Zika. Based on the previously reported 291 Yap Island epidemic of 2007 [34] , the percentage of symptomatic infections can be assumed 292 to be close to 18%. Unfortunately, measures of the proportion of individuals seeking medical 293 attention and being correctly diagnosed do not exist for FSA, although it is well known that 294 correct diagnosis for DENV is highly imperfect in Brazil [43] . We therefore performed a 295 sensitivity analysis by varying both the proportions of infected individuals seeking medical 296 attention and the proportion of those being correctly diagnosed for Zika. Figure 5A shows 297 that if any of these proportions is less than 10%, or with any combination of both less than 298 25%, our observation rate of 3.6 per 1000 infections can easily be explained.
299
Finally we investigated the sensitivity of our results with regards to the expected 300 number of newborns presenting either microcephaly or other neurological complications. 301 Following the observation that virtually all reported cases were issued before the summer of 302 2016, we assumed that, if indeed associated with ZIKV infection during pregnancy, these 303 would have been a consequence of the first epidemic wave in 2015. We therefore used the 304 estimated attack rate of approximately 70% from 2015 ( Figure 4A ) and varied the local 305 birth rate and the theoretical risk of ZIKV associated neurological complications to obtain 306 an expected number of cases. In agreement with other reports [7, 44, 45, 46] , our model 307 predicted a relatively low risk for complications given ZIKV infection during pregnancy 308 ( Figures 5B, C and S2 ). In particular, using a conservative total of 21 confirmed microcephaly 309 cases in FSA between 2015 and 2016, i.e. rejecting suspected or other complications, we 310 estimate an average risk of approximately 0.3% of pregnancies experiencing ZIKV infection 311 to develop microcephaly-associated syndromes. Including the 3 foetal deaths where ZIKV 312 infections were confirmed during pregnancy plus 3 other cases with confirmed neurological 313 complications after birth (total of 27 cases) increased the risk close to 0.4%, which rose 314 further to 0.5 % when also including 9 individuals that are currently under surveillance. Using an ento-epidemiological mathematical model of Zika virus (ZIKV) transmission, driven 333 by temporal climate data and fitted to notified case data, we analysed the 2015-2016 outbreak 334 in the city of Feira de Santana (FSA), in the Bahia state of Brazil. Using this framework we 335 explored the epidemiological and ecological context of this outbreak and determined the 336 conditions that led to the spread of the virus as well as its future endemic and epidemic 337 potential. As FSA presents high suitability for Zika's mosquito-vectors and with its particular 338 geographical setting acting as a state commerce and transport hub, our results should have 339 major implications for other urban centres in Brazil and elsewhere.
340
The epidemic pattern of ZIKV in FSA was in clear contrast to country-level observations, 341 where case numbers were considerably higher during the second wave in 2016. In order to 342 resolve whether this was due to a lower transmission potential of ZIKV in 2016 in FSA 343 we calculated the daily reproductive number, R 0 (t), between 2013 and 2016. We found no 344 notable decrease in 2016 in comparison to other years, but did notably find 2015 to present 345 the highest potential, in line with the hypothesis that a particularly warm and wet year 346 driven by El Niño may have temporarily boosted transmission potential of arboviruses [47] . 347 By fitting our model to weekly case data we also estimated the observation rate, i.e. the 348 fraction of cases that were notified as Zika out of the estimated total number of infections. 349 It has previously been reported that the vast majority of Zika infections go unnoticed (Table 350 1), which is in agreement with our estimates of an observation rate below 1%. Based on 351 this, around 69% of the local population were predicted to have been infected by ZIKV 352 during the first wave in 2015, which is in the same range as Zika outbreaks in French 353 Polynesia (66%) [44] and Yap Island (73%) [34] . The accumulation of herd-immunity caused 354 a substantial drop in the virus's effective reproductive number (R e ) and hence a significantly 355 lower number of cases during the second wave in 2016. In the context of FSA, it is possible 356 that the high similarity of case definition to DENV, the concurrent CHIKV epidemic, and 357 the low awareness of ZIKV at that time could have resulted in a significant number of ZIKV 358 infections being classified as either dengue or chikungunya. Furthermore, based on our 359 analysis we would argue that the percentage of correctly diagnosed ZIKV infections must 360 have been exceptionally low (<20%).
361
The age structure of ZIKV notified cases in FSA showed a higher than expected 362 incidence risk ratio (IRR) for individuals under the age of 4 years and a lower than expected 363 risk for individuals aged +50 years. This contrasts the observation during the Zika outbreak 364 on Yap Island in 2007, where all age classes, except the elderly, presented similar attack rates 365 [34] . We note here, however, that the Yap Island analysis was based on both a retrospective 366 analysis of historical hospital records and prospective surveillance (serology, surveys). It is 367 therefore possible that the signatures amongst the youngest and oldest individuals in FSA 368 may reflect deficiencies and/or biases in local notified data. In particular, such signatures 369 could emerge by both a rush of parents seeking medical services driven by a hyped media 370 coverage during the ZIKV epidemic, and a very small proportion of the elderly seeking or 371 having access to medical attention. We also found a small increase in IRR in the 20-34 years 372 age group, particularly during 2016, which could be indicative of the small contribution 373 of sexual transmission. Most of these observations are speculative, however, and more 374 detailed data will be required to fully understand these age-related risk patterns. For 375 instance, initiatives such as the ZIBRA Project [48, 35] , which perform mobile and real-time 376 sampling with portable genome sequencing, could prove to be essential for a retrospective 377 and future analysis of the ZIKV epidemic in Brazil, especially in areas where high levels of 378 herd-immunity will prevent large-scale circulation in the coming years.
379
The implicit consideration of climate variables as drivers of vector biology in our model 380 framework allowed us to ascertain the relative roles of temperature, humidity and rainfall 381 for the reproductive potential (R 0 and R e ) of ZIKV. Similar to other studies in temperate 382 and tropical settings, we found that temperature, with its direct influence on mosquito 383 lifespan, aquatic development and extrinsic incubation period, was the key driver of seasonal 384 oscillations in the transmission potential [23, 49, 28, 24] . Rainfall, on the other hand, only 385 played a marginal role and appeared to be a relevant player for arboviral transmission mainly 386 in tropical regions subject to intense rain seasons, such as areas in South East Asia [50, 51] . 387 The oscillations in R 0 presented seasonal windows of maximum transmission potential during 388 the summer months between December and April. This would imply local surveillance and 389 mitigation strategies, such as vector control, should be focused during this period with 390 special attention between December and January, for which the virus could maximize its 391 transmission potential.
392
A phylogenetic analysis has proposed that the introduction of ZIKV into Bahia took 393 place between March and September 2014, although without direct evidence for its circulation 394 in FSA at that time [52] . Our estimated date of introduction showed support for a date 395 in mid-January 2015, a few months after the proposed introduction into Bahia. However, 396 the posterior presented a wide margin stretching back to October 2014, suggesting that 397 some of the parameter space obtained by the Bayesian approach is compatible with ZIKV 398 circulation between September and December 2014. A mid-January introduction of ZIKV 399 also implies a three week lag before the first case was notified in FSA. Similar periods 400 between the first notification and estimated introduction often represent the time taken to 401 complete one or more full transmission cycles (human-mosquito-human) before a cluster of 402 cases is generated of sufficient size for detection by passive surveillance systems [23] . The 403 case data also shows a 2-months period after the first notification during which weekly case 404 numbers remained extremely low. This long period was unexpected as persistent circulation 405 of ZIKV could hardly be justified by the observed total of only 10 cases. Given our estimated 406 observation rate, however, the true number of ZIKV infections during this time amounted 407 to just over 2,700 actual cases. In April, the number of notifications increased rapidly, 408 coinciding with the Micareta festival, which we argue may have played a role in igniting the 409 exponential phase of the epidemic by facilitating human-vector mixing as well as a more 410 rapid geographical expansion. Another interesting observation was that the 2015 ZIKV 411 epidemic peaked approximately 3 months after the estimated peak in the virus's transmission 412 potential, whereas there was much higher synchrony during the second wave in 2016. The 413 same behaviour has been described for the chikungunya outbreak in FSA in 2014-2015 and 414 which has been attributed to the highly discordant spatial distributions between the first 415 two epidemics. It is likely that similar [5] or other heterogeneities [53] were responsible for 416 the observed differences in the Zika outbreaks, although unfortunately we do not have access 417 to spatial data to explore this hypothesis further.
418
After calibrating our model to the 2015-2016 epidemic, we projected the transmission of 419 ZIKV beyond 2017 using stochastic simulations and average climatic variables representative 420 of typical yearly trends. Without the possibility of externally acquired infections, local 421 extinction was highly likely by 2017 due to high levels of herd-immunity. According to 422 our study, Zika's reproductive potential (R e ) is expected to remain below 1 for at least 423 another 5 years, given the slow replenishment of susceptibles in the population through 424 births. When explicitly modelling the importation of infectious cases, our projections for the 425 coming decades corroborated the conclusions of previous modelling studies that suggest a 426 weak endemic potential for ZIKV after the initial exhaustion of the susceptible pool [14, 20] . 427 However, our simulations further showed that the future epidemic behaviour was strongly 428 dependent on the frequency of re-introductions, where sporadic and unpredictable epidemics 429 could still be in the order of hundreds of cases. Furthermore, given our estimated observation 430 rate for the 2015-2016 epidemic, the current passive surveillance system is unlikely to detect 431 the occurrence of such small epidemics. Efforts should therefore be placed to improve ZIKV 432 detection and diagnosis in order to optimize the local reporting rates.
Human sexual and vertical transmission of ZIKV infections is an important public 434 health concern, especially within the context of potential Zika-associated microcephaly and 435 other neurological complications in pre-and neonatals. With a total of over 10,000 live births 436 in 2015 in FSA, our crude estimate for the risk of complications per pregnancy given ZIKV 437 infection was between 0.3 and 0.5%, depending on the number of suspected and/or confirmed 438 cases, which translates to about 4-6 expected cases per 100,000 individuals. As discussed 439 elsewhere [44] , this risk is extremely low when compared to other known viral-associated 440 complications, such as those caused by infections by cytomegalovirus (CMV) and the rubella 441 virus (RV) [54, 55] . It is therefore crucial to reiterate that what makes the ZIKV a public 442 health concern is not the per pregnancy risk of neurological complications, but rather the 443 combination of low risk with very high attack rates. According to our study, about 70% of 444 pregnant women in FSA would have been challenged with ZIKV, equating to just above 445 7100 gestations at risk. Other studies have reported that the risk for complications during 446 the 1 st trimester of gestation is higher than the one estimated here. For example, in the 447 French Polynesia (FP) outbreak [44] , the risk associated with ZIKV infection during the 448 1 st trimester was 1%, while the overall, full pregnancy risk was 0.42%, similar to our FSA 449 estimates. For the Yap Island epidemic, no microcephaly cases have been reported. With an 450 estimated number of 24 births per 1,000 females (census 2000 as in [34] ) and using an overall 451 risk of approximately 0.4% per pregnancy, only between 0-3 cases per 100,000 individuals 452 would have been expected. However, the island's small population size (7391 individuals 453 [34] ) together with a general baseline of 0-2 microcephaly cases per 100,000 in many areas 454 of the world (ex. Brazil, Europe) [46, 56, 57] , would explain the absence of reported cases. 455
There are certain limitations to our approach, many of which could be revisited when 456 more detailed data becomes available. For example, we assumed homogeneous mixing 457 between human and mosquito hosts but it is possible that spatio-temporal heterogeneities 458 may have played a role in FSA. Furthermore, we have curated and integrated functional 459 responses of key entomological parameters to temperature, rainfall and humidity variation, 460 which were originally reported for dengue viruses. Due to lack of reliable data we have also 461 assumed a constant observation rate for the 2015-2016 outbreak, whereas it is likely that 462 due to a greater awareness and surveillance efforts to ZIKV in 2016, the rate may have been 463 higher during the second wave. Our fitting approach is also dependent on notified case data 464 and it is possible that the reported cases are not representative of the initial expansion of 465 the virus, which may have thwarted the obtained posterior for introduction date. Finally, 466 our future projections for the endemic and epidemic potential of ZIKV are based on average 467 climatic trends of past years and do not capture the occurrence of natural variation between 468 years, in particular for years affected by major Southern American climate events, such as 469 the El Niño(a) [47] . 470 In this study we have addressed the local determinants of ZIKV epidemiology in the 471 context of a major urban centre of Brazil. Our results imply that control and surveillance of 472 ZIKV should be boosted and focused in periods of high temperature and during major social 473 events. These factors could identify windows of opportunity for local interventions to mitigate 474 ZIKV introduction and transmission and should be transferable to any area for which both 475 temperature data and community event schedules are available. We further confirm that 476 the high transmission potential of ZIKV in areas like FSA can lead to the exhaustion of the 477 local susceptible pool, which in turn dictate the long-term epidemic and endemic behaviour 478 of the virus. Depending on the rate of re-introduction, sporadic outbreaks can be expected, 479 although these will be unlikely to result in a notable increase in the number of microcephaly 480 cases due to their limited sizes and low risk per pregnancy. Nonetheless, these sporadic 481 occurrences could still have important, local public health consequences, and we argue that 482 much better diagnostics and thus reporting rates are required for local authorities to detect 483 and respond to such events in the near future. Our integrated mathematical framework is 484 capable of deriving key insights into the past and future determinants of ZIKV epidemiology, 485 which should be applicable to the eco-epidemiological settings of other major urban centres 486 of Brazil and elsewhere. [61, 63, 20] 
487
